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CASES NOTED
as the waiver required.';-, The courts, alone, possess no power to grant
immunity in order to force discovery.",
The court, in the instant case, based the waiver upOl1 an implied con-
tractual relationship arising between appellants and the court upon the
formwr's assumption of the obligations of sureties. It reasoned that a
surety's duty to the court does not end with forfeiture of the bail fund, but
continues until the defendants arc delivered into the custody of the court.
Upon voluntary assumption of the role, the right to claim any privilege upon
relevant topics is waived. The sureties were therefore held obliged to reveal
knowledge of the fugitives' whereabouts, notwithstanding that "all the prece-
dents say that the ...privilege ...cannot be abolishcd constitutionally by
advance contracts between private persons or even between a government
and its crime-detecting officials."17
Never before have the courts so extended an implied waiver.' 8 Whether
the privilege itself is an archaic result of the rebellion against the tyranny of
the Church and its Oath Ex Officio,'0 or necessary for the preservation of
our American heritage of "political liberty and personal freedom, °"20 the
court in the instant case has, without adequate precedent, carved another
exception out of a privilege already deeply scarred.'
DOMESTIC RELATIONS - RIGHT OF UNEMANCIPATED
MINOR TO SUE PARENT FOR PERSONAL TORT
Plaintiff, an unemancipated iminor, brought an action by his next friend
against a partnership of which his father was a member for injuries sustained
as a result of defendants' negligence in the maintenance of their property.
Held, that a parent in his business or vocational capacity is not immune
15. See Apodoca v. Viramontcs, 53 N.M. 513, 212 P.2d 425 (1949); People v.
Lorch, 171 Misc. 469, 13 N.Y.S.2d 155 (Ct. Gcn. Sess. 1939); People v. Reiss, 8
N.Y.S.2d 209, 20 N.E.2d 8 (1939).
16. Apodoca v. Viramontes, supra note 15.
17. See United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92, 107 (2d Cir. 1951) (dissenting opinion
by Frank, v.). , (t
18. State v. Allison, 116 Mont. 352, 153 P.2d 141 (1944) (waiver of tie privilege
must be intelligent and informed); Powell v. Commonwealth, 167 Va. 558, 189 S.E. 433
(1937) (waiver must be made understandingly and willingly).
19. Seabury, Address, 18 A.B.A.J. 371 (1932) (detrimental to proper administration
of justice); BrNrHAM, RATIONALE OF JUDICIAL EV1IDENci.E, b. IX, pt. IV, c. III (Bowring's
ed., vol. VII, pp. 452 ff., 1827) (He classifies reasons for the existence of the privilege
into: (1) "old woman's reason" that it's "hard on a man;" (2) "fox hunter's" concept
of fair sport; (3) confounding of interrogation with ancient torture; and (4) association
of the privilege as against unpopular institutions such as the ecclesiastical courts.).
20. Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 631 (1886). 8 ,VIoCasoE, EVIDENCE §
2251 (3d ed. 1940) (though Wigmore reprints sections of Bentham's amusingly scathing
criticisms, he advocates preservation of the privilege as preventive of the adverse effects
of administrative reliance upon self-accusation and disclosure for conviction). See Inlay,
The Paradoxical Self-Incrimination Rule, 6 MiAmi L.Q. 147, 148 (1952).
21. Query: Would the instant court have held the same way if the fugitives had not
been alleged Communists?
MIAMI LAW QUARTERLY
from a personal tort action by his unemancipated minor child. Signs v.
Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743 (Ohio 1952).
The early common law reveals no rule barring an unemancipated minor
from maintaining a personal tort action against his parent.' However, such
a rule was introduced by Hewellette v. George" and has crystallized into a
doctrine of absolute parental immunity finding rigid application in an over-
whelming majority of our courts.3 The rationale principally employed by
these courts is that a contrary rule would: (1) disrupt domestic harmony
and parental discipline;4 (2) encourage fraudulent and collusive suits;5 (3)
deplete family funds to the prejudice of other family members.8
Recently, the vigorous dissent in Small v. Morrison7 initiated a trend
denying parental immunity in certain cases. Recovery has been allowed
where a dual relationship existed between the parties, such as master-servant8
or carrier-passenger." However, the presence of liability insurance was a
factor in awarding recovery in these cases. Parents have been held liable
when guilty of willful or malicious conduci. 10 Their immunity has further
been disregarded by allowing the action against the parent's employer.1' The
privilege accorded natural parents has been denied persons in loco parentis
1. See Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 354, 150 Atl. 905, 906 (1930); EVERSLEY,
DOMESTIC RELATIONS 571 (4th ed. 1926); PRossER, TORTS 905 (1941); MCCURDY,
Torts Between Persons in Domestic Relations, 43 llAnv. L. REv. 1030, 1057 (1930);
Comment, 18 B.U.L. Rzv. 468 (1938). But see McKelvey v. McKelvey, ill Tenn.
388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 243, 79 Pac. 788, 789 (1905).
2. 68 Miss. 703, 9 So. 885 (1891).
3. E.g., Rambo v. Rambo, 195 Ark. 832, 114 S.W.2d 468 (1938); McKelvey v.
McKelvey, Ill Tern. 388, 77 S.W. 664 (1903); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79
Pac. 788 (1905); Securo v. Securo, 110W. Va. 1,156 S.E. 750 (1931); 2 COOLEY, TORTS
41 (4th ed. 19321; PROsSER, TORTS 905 (1941). But see Could v. Christianson, 10 Fed.
Cas. 857, 864, No. 5636 (S.D.N.Y. 1836); Nelson v. Johansen, 18 Neb. 180, 24 N.W.
730 (1885); Lander v. Seaver, 32 Vt. 114 (1859).
4. Small v. Morrison, 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Matarese v. Matarese,
47 R.I. 131, 131 Atl. 198 (1925); Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905);
Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis. 260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927); EVERSLEY, Op. cit. supra note 1,
at 571; McCurdy, supra note 1, at 1074, 1076.
5. Luster v. Luster, 299 Mass. 480, 13 N.E.2d 438 (1938); McCurdy, supra note
1, at 1073.
6. Roller v. Roller, 37 Wash. 242, 79 Pac. 788 (1905); McCurdy, supra note 1,
at 1073.
7. 185 N.C. 577, 118 S.E. 12 (1923); Sorrentino v. Sorrentino, 248 N.Y. 626,
162 N.E. 551 (1928) (Cardozo, C.J., and Andrews and Crane, J.J., recorded their
dissent without opinion to decision barring action by child); Wick v. Wick, 192 Wis.
260, 212 N.W. 787 (1927) (dissenting opinion).
8. Dunlap v. Dunlap, 84 N.H. 352, 150 Atl. 905 (1930).
9. Worrell v. Worrell, 174 Va. 11, 4 S.E.2d 343 (1939); Lusk v. Lusk, 113
W. Va. 17, 166 S.E. 538 (1932).
10. Brown v. Cole, 198 Ark. 417, 129 S.W.2d 245 (1939) (murder); Mahnke v.
Moore, 77 A.2d 923 (Md. 1951) (murder of child's mother and committing suicide
in child's presence); Meyer v. Ritterbush, 276 App. Div. 972, 94 N.Y.S.2d 620 (2d Dep't
1950) (murder occasioned by suicide of parent); Cowgill v. Boock, 189 Ore. 218, 218
P.2d 445(1950) (manslaughter).
11. Chase v. New Haven W.aste Material Corp., 111 Conn. 377, 150 Atl. 107
(1930); Foy v. Foy, 231 N.C. 161, 56 S.E.2d 418 (1949); LeSage v. LeSage, 224 Wis.
57, 271 N.W. 369 (1937).
CASES NOTED
by holding them liable for a failure to provide necessaries 12 and for the in-
fliction of unreasonable punishment.13
The court in the instant case recognized that radical social and economic
changes justify a departure from the general rule when the parent is acting
in a business or vocational capacity. a4 The rationale underlying the general
rule was criticized on the ground that the aforementioned objections are
applicable to property actions between parent and child which have always
been allowed. 15 It was also expressly stated that the presence of liability
insurance should be disregarded since it has no effect upon the merits of
the case.'
With this decision another inroad has been made into the general rule.
Heretofore the parent has been held liable in his dual capacity only when
protected by liability insurance. While the case furthers the present trend
and reaches an equitable result the court seems to apply an artificial rule
that may be difficult to administer since no standards are specified for deter-
mining when a parent is acting in a business or vocational capacity. The
decision also leaves undecided the question whether the rule is to be exclu-
sive in its application and thus bar redress for willful and malicious torts.
It is unfortunate that the court did not differentiate between duties grow-
ing out of the parental relation and those owed to the world in general and
base their recovery upon such fact rather than on the nebulous concept of
dual capacity. A more workable rule would be to grant immunity only when
the parent is reasonably discharging a parental duty.
EVIDENCE - BURDEN OF PROOF - BURDEN OF GOING
FORWARD
Defendant, driving an automobile while under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor, struck deceased who died immediately. Defendant was
charged with involuntary manslaughter.' Held, that when a wound from
which death might ensue has been inflicted and thereafter death occurs,
the burden of proof is upon accused to make it appear that death did not
result from the wound but from some other cause, Hopper v. State, 54
So.2d 165 (Fla. 1951).
The general rule is that the state, in a criminal case, must prove by
competent evidence every essential element of the crime beyond and to
12. Foley v. Foley, 61 II1. App. 577 (1895) (medical care); Clasen v. Pruhs, 69
Neb. 278, 95 N.W. 640 (1903) (food and clothing).
13. Steber v. Norris, 188 Wis. 366, 206 N.W. 173 (1925).
14. Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 748 (Ohio 1952).
15. Alston v. Alston, 34 Ala. 15 (1859); Preston v. Preston, 102 Conn. 96, 128
At. 29 (1925); Crowley v. Crowley, 72 N.11. 241, 56 Atl. 190 (1903); Lamb v. Lamb,
146 N.Y. 317, 41 N.E. 26 (1895).
16. Signs v. Signs, 103 N.E.2d 743, 747 (Ohio 1952).
1. FLA. STAT. § 860.01 (1951).
